UIC Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 4

Article 1

2019

Justice Anthony Kennedy as Senior Associate Justice: Influence
and Impact, 53 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV. 907 (2019)
Charles Jacob
Christopher Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles F. Jacob & Christopher E. Smith, Justice Anthony Kennedy as Senior Associate Justice: Influence
and Impact, 53 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV. 907 (2019)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss4/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY AS SENIOR
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE: INFLUENCE AND
IMPACT
CHARLES F. JACOBS* AND CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH**
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 907
THE RECORD OF JUSTICE KENNEDY AS DOMINANT
SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE .................................. 912
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE KENNEDY AS
DOMINANT SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ............ 918
A. Legal Protections for LGBTQ Persons ....................920
B. Other Controversial Equality Issues ......................922
C. Criminal Sentencing ................................................925
D. Representation by Counsel ......................................927
E. Other Criminal Justice Issues .................................928
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 933

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a brief note delivered to the White House on June 27, 2018,
Justice Anthony Kennedy submitted his resignation as Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 1 At a political event in
Fargo, North Dakota later that day, President Donald Trump
praised the retiring justice as a “very special guy.” 2 Kennedy was
appointed to the high court3 during the Reagan Revolution of the
1980s.4 Yet, conservatives who had expected him, and other Reagan
* Associate Professor Political Science, St. Norbert College. B.A., Kenyon
College, 1989; M.A., University of Akron, 1995; Ph.D., University of
Connecticut, 2006.
** Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard
University, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of
Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
1. Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthonykennedy-retire-supreme-court.html.
2. Jessica Taylor, President Trump: Kennedy Retirement Makes Senate
Control ‘Vital’ for Republican, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 27, 2018),
www.npr.org/2018/06/27/624131008/president-trump-kennedy-retirementmakes-senate-control-vital-for-republicans.
3. Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, November 12, 1987, at A1.
4. The Reagan Revolution was a political and ideological transformation
cultivated and implemented by President Ronald Reagan through his political
campaigns and presidential administration. It attempted to transform
economic, bureaucratic, and legal policies to undo elements of the New Deal-era
programs instituted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and subsequent
Democratic administration. The Reagan administration altered the shape of the
federal bench by appointing presumptively-supportive conservative jurists to
the judgeships. By the conclusion of his two terms in office, Reagan was
responsible for the appointment of nearly half of all judges serving on the
federal judiciary. See Hugh Heclo, The Mixed Legacies of Ronald Reagan, 38
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 555 (2008) (assessing Ronald Reagan’s presidency as it
related to eight broad categories of the public); MICHAEL MEEROPOL,
907
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judicial appointees, to transform American constitutional law were
often disappointed—and angry—about his failure to support the full
range of policies propounded by late-twentieth century
conservatives.5 For political conservatives, Kennedy was a
disappointing substitute for Judge Robert Bork, President Reagan’s
outspokenly-conservative and unsuccessful first choice to fill the
vacancy opened on the Court by the retirement of Justice Lewis
Powell.6 In particular, Republicans were often disappointed by
Kennedy’s penchant for casting the fifth and deciding vote in a
number of significant cases that sustained and expanded rights and
liberties in ways antithetical to conservatives. 7
When the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed Kennedy in
1988,8 he earned the support of many Democrats who believed his
approach to constitutional interpretation was more moderate than
the approaches of conservatively-doctrinaire Justice Antonin Scalia
and Chief Justice William Rehnquist. 9 The hopefulness of liberals
was vindicated for some issues as Kennedy regularly produced
opinions that protected or expanded civil liberties and due process
rights in the areas of abortion, gay rights, and affirmative action. 10
While Kennedy was not consistently liberal in his interpretation of
constitutional or statutory provisions, 11 his apparent moderation
SURRENDER: HOW THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION COMPLETED THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION (1998); Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Supreme
Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 18, 1991), www.nybooks.com/articles/1991/
07/18/the-reagan-revolution-and-the-supreme-court/.
5. See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 198-99 (2007) (stating “Ever since his apostasy on abortion in
[Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)], Kennedy had been
anathema to the conservative movement . . .).
6. David Savage, To the Dismay of Some, Kennedy’s No Bork, L.A. TIMES
(May 22, 1996, 12:00 AM), www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-05-22-mn7044-story.html.
7. Andrew Sullivan, Anthony Kennedy and the Death of True American
Conservatism, N.Y. MAG. (June 29, 2018), www.nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/
06/anthony-kennedy-and-the-death-of-true-american-conservatism.html; Todd
Ruger, Reagan Aides Foresaw Kennedy Gay Rights Views that Conservatives
Now Lament, ROLL CALL (June 26, 2015), www.rollcall.com/news/reagan_
aides_foresaw_kennedy_gay_rights_views_that_conservatives_now_lament242563-1.html.
8. See Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 97 to 0, Confirms Kennedy to High Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1988), www.nytimes.com/1988/02/04/us/senate-97-to-0confirms-kennedy-to-high-court.html (stating the Senate confirmed Kennedy on
February 3, 1988).
9. David M. O’Brien, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to
Rehnquist, 20 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 12 (1987).
10. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(reaffirming “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State”); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
11. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT
AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69-70 (2005) (“This overlooks the
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provided assurances that he might be persuaded to sustain
freedoms won in legal battles decades earlier. 12
During the later years of Kennedy’s career on the Court, this
narrative regarding his role as the moderate “swing justice” 13
dominated the analysis of his tenure on the bench and influence on
the law.14 Discussions of his legacy and the likely impact of his
successor often focused on his habit of delivering the “key vote”15 in
cases of public importance while overlooking other roles he played
that impacted myriad areas of the law. 16 Kennedy inherited one
such role merely due to his longevity on the Court. 17 With the
retirement in 2010 of Justice John Paul Stevens, who had served
for 35 years on the bench,18 Kennedy became the “dominant senior
associate justice” (dominant SAJ or DSAJ) among his eight
colleagues who served as associate justices. 19 The dominant SAJ “is
a Justice who—as a result of seniority, the stability of the
membership of the Court, and ideological position—dominates the
fact that O’Connor and Kennedy were conservatives . . . and were perhaps the
last representatives of an older, country club Republicanism . . . .”).
12. Justice Kennedy was viewed by his liberal colleagues as a generally
conservative justice who was amenable to possible persuasion as evidenced, for
example, by Justice John Paul Stevens’s description of the unsuccessful
targeting of Kennedy for conversion in the case that declared the Second
Amendment to contain a right for individuals, rather than state militias alone,
to possess firearms. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE:
REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94 YEARS 485 (2019).
13. See, e.g., Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75
J. POL. 1089, 1091 (2013) (stating “We define the swing justice as the one who
casts the pivotal fifth majority vote in each Supreme Court case”).
14. See, e.g., MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
CONSTITUTION 79 (2013) (illustrating that “Kennedy voted in four [cases] with
the Court’s liberal wing and in four with the conservative wing—a sign of his
clear emergence as the Court’s swing vote . . .”).
15. Amy Howe, Anthony Kennedy, Swing Justice, Announces Retirement,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2018, 7:01 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/anthonykennedy-swing-justice-announces-retirement/.
16. In contrast, scholars have paid attention to other justices’ roles other
than being the decisive voter in key cases. See Christopher E. Smith & Ksenia
Petlakh, The Roles of Justice Sonia Sotomayor in Criminal Justice Cases, 45
CAP. U. L. REV. 457 (2017) (examining Justice Sotomayor’s opinion on criminal
justice cases as it relates to her past experience in the legal field); Christopher
E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in Criminal Justice Cases, 39
SUFFOLK L. REV. 719 (2006).
17. Justice Kennedy served on the Supreme Court for 30 years. Robert
Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme Court,
Announces
His
Retirement,
WASH.
POST
(June
27,
2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-the-pivotalswing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retirement/2018/06/27/a40a8c645932-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html.
18. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: DEFENDER OF RIGHTS
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2015).
19. Charles F. Jacobs & Christopher E. Smith, The Influence of Justice John
Paul Stevens: Opinion Assignments by the Senior Associate Justice, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 743, 753 (2011).
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assignment of opinion-writing duties when the Chief Justice is not
in the majority.”20 In this role, the dominant SAJ will designate
authorship of 50 percent or more of the opinions available to be
assigned by a justice other than the chief justice and thereby exceed
the number of assignments made by any other associate justice.21
The dominant SAJ may or may not also be the senior associate
justice (SAJ), a title bestowed upon the longest-serving justice on
the high court who does not hold the position of chief justice. 22 With
the retirement of Justice Stevens in 2010, that title of SAJ shifted
to Justice Scalia who was confirmed to the bench 18 months prior
to Kennedy.23 However, Scalia’s judicial philosophy seldom put him
at odds with Chief Justice John Roberts (or Chief Justice Rehnquist
before him), thereby giving him few opportunities to assign writing
duties as an associate justice. 24 Scalia himself suggested the
insignificance of the position of SAJ if not concurrently paired with
the role of DSAJ.25 When asked during an interview about his status
as the SAJ, he commented that “[a]ll it does for me is I get
20. Id.
21. Id. The definition of this concept has evolved since first operationalized
in 2011. Originally, the variable was defined in such a manner that an associate
justice would be recognized as dominant only if she or he assigned more opinions
than all of the remaining associate justices combined. However, there are terms
of the Court during which a single associate justice assigns exactly half of
opinions. In this scenario, one encountered during the final years Kennedy
served on the bench, the dominant SAJ still maintains more influence over the
process than other associate justices.
22. The longest-serving justice, who is the literal SAJ, has two distinctive
roles in sitting next to the chief justice as the center of the bench during oral
arguments and speaking second, after the chief justice, when cases are
discussed at the Supreme Court’s weekly private conference. However, the
literal SAJ will not necessarily be in the majority when the chief justice
dissents. Thus, the literal SAJ need not necessarily be the dominant SAJ for
opinion-assigning purposes. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME
COURT MEMOIR 135 (2011) (stating “Seniority determines where each of the
nine justices sit. The chief has the center seat, the senior associate sits on his
right . . .”); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 230 (4th ed. 1993) (“The chief justice makes the initial presentation of
a case. . . .Each justice, the most senior justice first and the most junior justice
last, then comments.”).
23. Justice Scalia was confirmed by the United States Senate on September
17, 1986 by a vote of 98-0. The Senate approved the nomination of Kennedy on
February 3, 1988. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM:
DATES, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 418-19 (6th ed. 2015).
24. During his time on the bench, Justice Scalia assigned writing duties on
19 occasions including seven that he assigned to himself. In the time that he
spent as SAJ, he assigned just 13 opinions to his colleagues, the last in the
spring of 2015 during the Court’s 2014 term. See The Supreme Court Database,
WASH. U. LAW, scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited September 12, 2019].
25. Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Brief: Kavanaugh’s First
(and Only) SCOTUS Argument; Justice Clarence Thomas in the ‘Right’ Seat
(July 11, 2018, 7:30 AM), www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/2018/07/11/
kavanaughs-first-and-only-scotus-argument-thomas-gets-the-right-seat-400892/?slreturn=20190603124226.

2019]

Justice Kennedy’s Influence and Impact

911

introduced as the senior associate justice. I feel I ought to come in
with a walker. No good otherwise.”26 Hence, the role of literal SAJ
is merely honorific, as Scalia bemoaned, serving as a title that
bestows little power or responsibility when the judicial philosophy
of the SAJ and the Chief Justice align. 27 Because Kennedy
disagreed more frequently with Chief Justice Roberts, the position
Kennedy inherited granted significantly more substantive
responsibility.28 After Stevens retired in 2010, when Roberts
dissented or recused himself from a case for which Kennedy voted
with the majority, Kennedy regularly had the power to influence
legal reasoning and doctrinal development by choosing the majority
opinion’s author.29
Scholars have recognized the importance of the power to
designate the author of majority opinions; 30 a power exercised by
the chief justice in most cases.31 For example, Walter Murphy, a
political scientist and prominent constitutional scholar, offered
some initial discussion of this process, theorizing that “an astute
[c]hief [j]ustice can . . . utilize his opinion-assigning power to
increase his influence on the Court.”32 By leveraging this power,
Murphy suggested that a strategic assignment—often to a moderate
member of the Court—has the capacity to “prevent defections or
gain adherents” to the majority position. 33 In doing so, the chief
justice may favor certain colleagues with weightier and more
significant cases while saddling disfavored colleagues with the
burden of crafting opinions for less interesting legal questions or

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra Table 1 (providing the majority opinion assignments by senior
associate justices for the 2010 term through the 2017 term).
29. The choice of the justice who will write the majority opinion ultimately
affects the tone and content of the opinion, including creating risks that a
selected justice in a close-vote case will write an opinion that is too emphatic to
retain the support of a majority of justices. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 144-52 (2016)
(describing Justice Potter Stewart removing his decisive support for the initial
majority in Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) in reaction to the articulation
of a strong First Amendment write in the draft majority opinion written by
Justice Stevens).
30. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 306 (3d ed. 1993) (stating “The power of opinion
assignment is perhaps a chief justice’s ‘single most influential function’”).
31. For example, in the Supreme Court’s 2018 Term, Chief Justice Roberts
voted with the majority, and thereby exercised the power to assign the majority
opinion, in 85 percent of cases. Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October
Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 5:59 PM), www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2018/ (providing link to Table titled:
Frequency in the Majority, www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/
StatPack_OT18-7_30_19-18.pdf).
32. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 84 (1964).
33. Id.
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with little likelihood of long-term legal impact.34
The value of penning any decision, as Lee Epstein and Jack
Knight suggest, is that “the author of the initial opinion draft can
significantly affect the policy the Court produces because the
opinion writer’s first draft establishes the initial position over which
justices bargain.”35 Because opinion assignments have
consequences for the development of legal doctrine, scholars have
focused some attention on the influence the chief justice has on this
process including the pattern of assignments and policy outcomes. 36
Given that Justice Kennedy exerted opinion-assigning authority in
his role as DSAJ, he deserves examination to determine if
discernible patterns or strategies exist that were employed to shape
legal policy.37

II. THE RECORD OF JUSTICE KENNEDY AS
DOMINANT SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
After 35 years serving as an associate justice, John Paul
Stevens announced his resignation from the bench in April of
2010.38 For the final 16 years of his tenure, the long-serving justice
had acted as both the literal SAJ and DSAJ in the later years of the
Rehnquist Court era and first years of the Roberts Court era.39
Stevens was effectively replaced by Kennedy in the DSAJ role at the
opening of the 2010 term of the Court,40 and Kennedy subsequently
assumed the role of literal SAJ with the passing of Scalia in
February of 2016.41 As previously discussed, Scalia’s high rate of
agreement with Chief Justice Roberts limited his opportunities to
assign majority opinions during the six years in which he was SAJ. 42
Kennedy, however, like Stevens before him,43 had numerous
opportunities to make majority opinion assignments because he
34. Id.
35. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 126 (1998).
36. See Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 745-46 (noting that the chief
justice is typically part of the majority and hence has significant influence over
writing assignments); O’BRIEN, supra note 30, at 306-14.
37. See infra Table 1 (providing the majority opinion assignments by senior
associate justices for the 2010 term through the 2017 term).
38. Robert Barnes, Justice John Paul Stevens Announces His Retirement
from Supreme Court, WASH. POST (April 10, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/AR2010040902312_pf.html.
39. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 751-54.
40. See infra Table 1 (providing the majority opinion assignments by senior
associate justices for the 2010 term through the 2017 term).
41. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scaliadeath.html?module=Promotron&region=Body&action=click&pgtype=article.
42. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (noting data that indicates
Scalia’s agreement with the chief justice and the limits this place on his ability
to exercise his role as SAJ).
43. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 758.
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regularly joined liberal majorities when Roberts was among the
conservative dissenters.44 The examination of Kennedy’s record as
the DSAJ will benefit from a comparison to Stevens, the colleague
who preceded him in the position of DSAJ. Comparing Stevens
offers insight into the behavior of another associate justice who
wielded this significant authority to assign the drafting of case
decisions.45 Such an appraisal will help reveal the existence of
patterns or trends and also underscore how differences and
similarities between and among DSAJs shape the exercise of the
authority granted to those in this position. 46
Kennedy assumed the role of DSAJ with the start of the 2010
term of the Court, then served eight years in this role. 47 His tenure
in this position was half as long as Justice Stevens who was the
DSAJ for 16 years.48 Stevens assigned majority opinion to his
colleagues in 177 cases, or 11.1 cases per each term as DSAJ. 49 By
contrast, across his entire career on the high court, Kennedy
assigned a total of 47 majority opinions as the DSAJ, or nearly a
half-dozen each term.50 As Table 1 shows, Kennedy’s role as
44. See Jonathan H. Adler, Say Good-Bye to the Kennedy Court, REASON
(June 28, 2018), www. reason.com/2018/06/28/say-goodbye-to-the-kennedycourt/ (describing Kennedy’s role on the Court including his agreement with the
Court’s liberals in one-third of cases that deeply-divided the justices).
45. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 748-51.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (noting that although
Scalia was the titular SAJ, Kennedy exercised the power to assign opinions as
SAJ with more regularity because he was less often in the majority with the
chief justice).
48. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 755.
49. Data for this analysis were collected using The Supreme Court Database,
supra note 24. The total number of case assignments made by both Stevens and
Kennedy were determined by using the analytical tools provided by the site that
provided the ability to select parameters that help to identify when particular
justices assigned the opinion-writing duties. For Justice Stevens, we reviewed
his initial year on the bench (the 1975 term) through his retirement after the
2009 term of the Court. For Justice Kennedy, our examination included the
1987 through the 2017 term. For each year, we included only orally argued cases
that produced a judgment or opinion of the Court. We excluded all decrees,
equally divided cases, as well as per curiam and seriatim opinion from our
review—all of which are unlikely to have an identified author who was assigned
the job of writing the opinion. For previous research on the behavior of the
DSAJ, see Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 750 n.45, which utilized a different
approach to identifying the assignor of the decision that included a review of
opinion-assignment sheets of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and review of the
coalition of justices in each case when that resource was unavailable. As a
result, there are differences between the total reported previously for Justice
Stevens and those presented here—although those differences are small.
50. Kennedy assigned a total of 48 opinions during his time on the Court.
However, through a quirk of the seniority possessed by the combination of
justices in the majority, he made one assignment in 2007 when all of his
colleagues with greater seniority, Stevens and Scalia, joined Roberts as
dissenters. That opinion, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007), was
assigned by Kennedy to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
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dominant senior associate justice (DSAJ) stems from the fact that
he assigned the majority opinion in 47 of the 65 cases during this
time period in which Chief Justice Roberts was among the
dissenters. In the eighteen cases in which Kennedy did not assign
the majority opinion, he joined Roberts among the dissenters,
thereby leaving the most senior associate justice in the majority to
make the assignment.51
During the period that Kennedy served as DSAJ, the justices
announced the judgment or opinion of the Court in 527 cases—an
average of 65.9 full decisions per year. Senior associate justices
assigned 12.3 percent of that total (65 cases) while Kennedy
handled 8.9 percent as DSAJ (47 cases) which constituted nearly
three-quarters of all SAJ-assigned cases (72.3 percent). Table 1
illustrates that for two of his eight years as DSAJ, Kennedy made
all of the assignments not made by the Chief Justice—2015 and
2016. During the 2013 term, he made just half of the assignments,
sharing the role of DSAJ with Justice Scalia who made three of the
six assignments that fell to associate justices. The greatest number
of assignments Kennedy made in a single term was twelve in 2014.
The least number of assignments he made in a term was three, in
two different terms.52
Table 1: Majority Opinion Assignments by Senior Associate Justices, 2010
Term-2017 Term53
Term
Total
Cases
Percent
Assigned by
Percent of SAJ
Cases
Assigned
of
Kennedy as
Assignments by
Per Term
by
Total
DSAJ
Kennedy
All SAJs
Cases
2010
75
8
10.7%
4
50.0%
2011
64
8
12.5%
6
75.0%
2012
73
11
15.1%
7
63.6%
2013
67
6
9.0%
3
50.0%
2014
66
15
22.7%
12
80.0%
2015
62
7
11.3%
7
100.0%
2016
61
5
8.2%
5
100.0%
2017
59
5
8.5%
3
60.0%
Total
527
65
12.30%
47
72.3%

As Table 2 illustrates, Stevens’s time as the dominant SAJ
differed from that of Kennedy in several ways. First, the Court
heard 1,206 total cases over the 16-year period under review, nearly
51. For example, during the 2016 Term, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts were together among the dissenters in only two cases, which included
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) and Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897
(2018). In Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 1204, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the senior
associate justice in the majority and she assigned the majority opinion to Justice
Elena Kagan. In Patchak, 138 S. Ct. 897, Justice Clarence Thomas was the
senior associate justice in the majority and he assigned the plurality opinion to
himself.
52. The Supreme Court Database, supra note 24.
53. Id.
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10 more cases per year than when Kennedy held position as DSAJ. 54
Of that total, SAJs assigned writing responsibility in 15.7 percent
of all cases, and Stevens as DSAJ assigned authorship in 14.7
percent of the decisions—higher percentages than Kennedy in both
instances. Notably, 93.7 percent of all opinion-writing assignments
by SAJs were made by Stevens, eclipsing the proportion made by
Kennedy by more than 20 percent. This difference is likely
attributable to the ideological position of each justice in relation to
their colleagues. Stevens, as the most liberal member of the Court
during his tenure as DSAJ, was not likely in the minority with
conservative Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts. Unlike Stevens,
Kennedy was the median justice—a position often synonymously
termed “the swing justice.” Sitting as he did in this location, it was
more likely that he would find himself in majorities constituted by
conservatives that included Chief Justice Roberts as well as more
frequently in dissent when Chief Justice Roberts also dissented.
Opportunities to assign majority opinion-writing duties as the SAJ
in the majority and the attendant ability to exert influence over the
content of decisions are affected by the frequency of disagreement
between the chief justice and the SAJ. 55
Table 2: Majority Opinion Assignments by Senior Associate Justice, 1994
Term-2009 Term56
Term
Total
Cases Percent of
Assigned
Percent SAJ
Cases Per
Assigned by
Total
by Stevens
Assignments
Term
All SAJs
Cases
as DSAJ
by Stevens
1994
82
13
15.9%
13
100%
1995
77
11
14.3%
11
100%
1996
80
10
12.5%
10
100%
1997
91
10
11.0%
10
100%
1998
77
14
18.2%
14
100%
1999
75
9
12.0%
9
100%
2000
78
15
19.2%
13
86.7%
2001
76
13
17.1%
12
92.3%
2002
72
9
12.5%
9
100%
2003
72
14
19.4%
14
100%
2004
74
25
33.8%
22
88%
2005
71
8
11.3%
8
100%
2006
67
10
14.9%
8
80%
2007
67
8
11.9%
7
87.5%
2008
74
14
18.9%
12
85.7%
2009
73
6
8.2%
5
83.3%
Total
1206
189
15.7%
177
93.7%

54. Id.
55. Id. Prior to Stevens assuming the role of DSAJ (the terms from 1975
until 1993), Stevens was in the Court majority 58.7 percent of the time. For the
16 terms he served as DSAJ (1994 to 2009), he found himself in the majority
59.4 percent of the time. For Kennedy, prior to becoming DSAJ (1987 to 2009),
he joined the majority in 74.9 percent of all cases. During the eight terms he
served as DSAJ, that number rose to 86 percent.
56. Id.
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Table 3 presents a comparison of majority opinion-writing
assignments by Justice Kennedy and Stevens across the issues
categories in which each made the greatest number of assignments.
The list constitutes half of the fourteen issue areas used for
classifying cases in the Supreme Court Database.57 During their
time as DSAJ, both Kennedy and Stevens allocated the greatest
percentage of cases in the area of criminal procedure—38 percent
for Kennedy and 35 percent for Stevens. This is not surprising as
criminal procedure cases constituted more than 25 percent of all
cases on the Court’s docket during period when Stevens became
DSAJ in 1994 until Kennedy’s departure from the bench in 2017. 58
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Majority Opinion Assignments Made
(per Issue Area): A Comparison of Justices Kennedy and Stevens59
Issue Area
Number of
Number of
Percentage
Percentage
Majority
Majority
Of Total
Of Total
Opinion
Opinion
Assignments
Assignments
Assignments
Assignments
Made:
Made:
Made:
Made:
Kennedy
Stevens
Kennedy
Stevens
(N=47)
(N=177)
Criminal
18
62
38.2%
35.0%
Procedure
Economic
10
20
21.3%
11.3%
Activity
Civil Rights
9
32
19.1%
18.1%
Due Process
4
6
8.5%
3.4%
Judicial
2
16
4.3%
9.0%
Procedures
Federalism
2
13
4.3%
7.3%
First
0
16
0.0%
9.0%
Amendment

Of the issue categories in the Supreme Court Database,
Criminal Procedure is the umbrella classification for the largest
number of sub-issues (60) among any issue areas.60 The second most
numerous area of law assigned by Kennedy concerned disputes
related to economic questions (21 percent) followed closely by civil
rights issues (19 percent). For Stevens, the order of the second and
third categories were flipped—18 percent of his assignments were
for civil rights cases and 11 percent for questions regarding
economic issues. For both justices, the percentage of total
assignments constituted by these three areas of law was quite

57. The Supreme Court Database uses the following categories to classify
cases: Attorneys; Civil Rights; Criminal Procedure; Due Process; Economic
Activity; Federal Taxation; Federalism; First Amendment; Interstate Relations;
Judicial Power; Miscellaneous; Privacy; Private Action; Unions. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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large—64 percent for Stevens and 78 percent for Kennedy—
suggesting that these issue areas were relatively numerous and
most frequently divided the justices in ways that placed
conservative chief justices among the dissenters.
An additional 18 percent of the cases Stevens assigned were in
the areas of the First Amendment and judicial procedures, each
constituting nine percent of all opinions for which he chose the
majority opinion writer. Kennedy’s next largest assignment area
involved questions of due process for which he assigned a total of
four cases or 8.5 percent of the total. In no other category of law did
Kennedy assign writing duties in more than two cases. The longer
time period for which Stevens was DSAJ, as well as his greater
frequency of disagreement with conservative Chief Justices
Rehnquist and Roberts, provided him with a larger number of cases
in which to assign opinions and also shaped the issue areas in which
those assignments were made.61
Table 4 provides a summary of the assignment choices made
by Justice Kennedy in his role as DSAJ. Although we cannot know
the reasons for the choices made concerning each case or issue,
lurking within these decisions are assignment strategies that
justices acknowledge as factors that drive the selection of majority
opinion writers.62 The strategies employed by majority opinion
assigners, whether chief justices or SAJs, include consideration of
both the issue area and the tone of opinions typically written by
individual justices.63 Opinion assigners can write majority opinions
themselves “as a means of advancing [their] values and policy
preferences.”64 Alternatively, opinion assigners may use other
strategies to shape legal doctrines and solidify majority support for
a case outcome:
If the chief justice or senior majority justice wishes to establish a
strong, clear precedent, he or she may assign the opinion to the most
outspoken member of the majority. If he or she fears that some
members of the majority are wavering, he or she may avoid a strident
opinion that might drive less committed justices over to the other
side.65

61. See Christopher E. Smith, Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, The
Roberts Court and Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 40 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 416, 422 (2015) (showing the agreement rate for Roberts and Stevens in
criminal justice cases was lower than that for Roberts and any other justice).
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007,
at 53 (Justice Stevens acknowledged during an interview that he assigned
majority opinions in close cases to “somebody [who] might not be solid” in order
to have them strengthen his or her own views by writing the majority’s
reasoning.).
63. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
269 (2d ed. 1997).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Table 4: Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion assignments as DSAJ, by
Author and Issue Area66
Justice
Criminal
Economic
Civil
Due
Other
Procedure
Activity
Rights
Process
Kennedy
5
3
4
4
1
Breyer
4
2
4
0
2
Ginsburg
2
1
1
0
2
Sotomayor
4
1
0
0
1
Kagan
2
2
0
0
0
Alito
1
0
0
0
0
Thomas
0
1
0
0
0
TOTAL
18
10
9
4
6
(N=47)

Kennedy, like Stevens before him, self-assigned the greatest
number of opinions by awarding themselves 36.2 and 33.3 percent
of cases, respectively.67 Kennedy took for himself more cases than
he assigned to any other justice in the three of the four most
frequently-arising issue areas, and he shared the top spot with
Justice Stephen Breyer in one classification—civil rights cases.
Obviously, self-assignment provides the most direct opportunity to
shape legal doctrine and such opportunities may be difficult to resist
when a DSAJ has strong views about how the majority opinion
should be crafted.68 As prior research has shown, SAJs are most
likely to assign majority opinions to justices who are close to sharing
their own judicial philosophies for a particular issue.69 Hence, it is
unsurprising that Kennedy made so many assignments to Breyer.
For example, Justice Breyer had the highest rate of agreement with
Kennedy on criminal justice-related issues when Chief Justice
Roberts is excluded from consideration, as Roberts must be for this
analytical point because Kennedy’s assignment opportunities only
arose when he disagreed with a dissenting Roberts. 70

III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE
KENNEDY AS DOMINANT SENIOR ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE
An SAJ could distribute majority opinion assignments like
dealing a deck of cards around a table, if imposing equal opinionwriting responsibilities on majority members was the sole criterion
66. The Supreme Court Database, supra note 24.
67. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 758.
68. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING THE LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 56 (2000)
(stating “Associate justices, like chief justices, also pursue their policy
preferences by giving desirable assignments to those with whom they agree
(frequently themselves)”).
69. Id.
70. Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 61, at 422.
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for assignments.71 However, SAJs are known to make strategic
decisions in assigning majority opinions.72 For example, Justice
Stevens appeared to target Justice Kennedy, in particular, with
assignments.73 Many observers presume that Kennedy, as the
median “swing justice” in the Court’s ideological spectrum, 74 was
the colleague whom Stevens feared was most likely to defect to the
other side during the weeks or months of the opinion-drafting
process if Kennedy was not actively involved in and putting his own
imprint upon that process.75 By contrast, Kennedy was his own
“defector” from the conservative wing in many of the 5-4 liberal
decisions during his SAJ service on the Roberts Court. 76 Thus, he
did not need to worry about losing a vote during the opinion-writing
process. As DSAJ, Kennedy was not at risk of losing his own decisive
vote in those cases for which he gained opinion-assignment duties—
especially when voting with the Court’s four most liberal justices. 77
It is important to remember that Kennedy did not choose these
issues as part of an agenda to influence the development of law by
knowing that he would write majority opinions in these cases. 78
71. Research indicates that, unlike chief justices who consider equitable
distribution of assignments as a factor in making opinion assignments, SAJs do
not appear to include that consideration in choices about to whom a majority
opinion should be assigned:
[Associate justices] appear unaffected by many of the contextual factors
that shape the chief’s assignments. Associate justices during the Burger
Court did not favor justices with lighter workloads or justices failing to
carry their fair share of the opinion-writing burden. While the chief’s
institutional responsibilities limited his ability to pursue preferred legal
outcomes, senior associate justices did not experience such a constraint.
MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS, & WAHLBECK, supra note 68, at 56 (discussing the
development of law through the process of decision writing).
72. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
73. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 759-61.
74. Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 13, at 1095; Howe, supra note 15.
75. See, e.g., Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 761 (explaining “Justice
Stevens may have assigned the [privacy rights] opinions to Justice Kennedy for
fear that opinions written in a too-liberal manner may have lost the votes of
both Justices Kennedy and O’Connor and thereby turned the outcome in a
different and, in the view of Justice Stevens, undesirable direction”).
76. See, e.g., Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 61, at 426-27 (Kennedy
was the conservative justice who most frequently parted company with his
typically like-minded colleagues in order to create a five-member majority in
support of a liberal outcome in criminal justice cases).
77. Id. (The opinion author cannot risk losing the least-committed voter in
a five-justice majority by writing a too-strong opinion when it is the opinion
author, him- or herself, who is the least committed voter, as was typically the
case for Kennedy when he wrote on behalf of his four liberal colleagues).
78. All of the Court’s justices participate in selecting cases for hearing,
typically without knowing with certainty in advance how each justice will vote
in every case. See PAMELA C. CORLEY, ARTEMUS WARD, & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MYTH AND REALITY IN LAW AND COURTS 38292 (2016) (description of involvement of nine justices and 36 law clerks in the
process of sifting through thousands of petitions in order to select fewer than
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These issues happened to be the ones that divided the Court, and
left Kennedy in disagreement with Chief Justice Roberts. Certain
types of issues that generated such divisions in multiple cases,
especially LGBTQ equality,79 criminal sentencing,80 and
representation by counsel,81 constituted a significant portion of the
cases in which Kennedy made assignment decisions. Within these
issues, Kennedy’s influence can be seen in the cases for which he
chose to shape the law by writing the majority opinions himself. 82

A. Legal Protections for LGBTQ Persons
During his service as dominant SAJ, Justice Stevens assigned
Justice Kennedy the responsibility for two path-breaking majority
opinions providing constitutional recognition of and protection for
LGBTQ persons.83 In Romer v. Evans,84 Kennedy wrote for a sixmember majority in a case concerning a Colorado ballot initiative
that barred municipalities in that state from enacting antidiscrimination ordinances to protect gays and lesbians from unfair
treatment in housing, employment, and other important aspects of
life.85 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion invalidated the Colorado
voters’ decision on equal protection grounds and thereby freed
municipalities to expand legal protections. 86 Until that moment,
discrimination against LGBTQ persons was so pervasive,
longstanding, and widely-accepted that many feared the Supreme
Court would never act against it.87
100 cases for complete hearings and decisions). Thus, Kennedy’s votes to grant
certiorari were made without him knowing with certainty either how the
justices would ultimately vote on the merits or who would be assigned the
majority opinion.
79. See infra notes 83-102 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases that included issues concerning same-sex marriage).
80. See infra notes 126-147 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases that included issues about defendants’ mental capacity and life sentences
for juveniles).
81. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases that included issues regarding defense attorneys’ responsibilities during
plea negotiations).
82. See infra notes 103-123 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases that included cases about issues concerning federal antidiscrimination
laws).
83. Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see Jacobs & Smith, supra
note 19, at 766-67 (discussing the role of the Chief Justice in the process of
assigning the duty to draft an opinion).
84. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
85. Id. at 623-25.
86. Id. at 635-36.
87. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Gay Rights Ruling: The Ruling; Gay
Rights Laws Can’t Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/21/us/gay-rights-ruling-ruling-gay-rightslaws-can-t-be-banned-high-court-rules.html (stating “The lawyer for the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, who worked on the case said the
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A few years later, Stevens assigned Kennedy the majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,88 the landmark decision that broke
new ground in its declaration regarding liberty interests that
provide constitutional protection for consensual, non-commercial,
private sexual conduct for all adults. 89 The decision invalidated the
Texas sodomy statute that authorized criminal prosecution for
same-sex sexual conduct and forthrightly overturned the Court’s
existing precedent from Bowers v. Hardwick.90 As described by
Jeffrey Toobin:
There was no mistaking the significance of Kennedy’s opinion. The
point was not that the Court was halting sodomy prosecutions, which
scarcely took place anymore. Rather, the Court was announcing that
gay people could not be branded as criminals simply because of who
they were. They were citizens. They were like everyone . . . . The
people who had devoted their lives to that cause understood precisely
what had happened, which was why, to a degree unprecedented in
the Court’s history, the benches [in the courtroom] were full of men
and women sobbing with joy.91

Justice Kennedy’s important role in writing opinions
concerning equality led observers to speculate that he saw the
Court’s provision of legal protection to LGBTQ persons as part of
his personal legacy in constitutional law. 92 Thus, it was no surprise
to such observers when Kennedy assigned himself the majority
opinion in Windsor v. United States93 after he inherited the role of
DSAJ at the time of Justice Stevens’s 2010 retirement from the
Court.94 The case concerned two women who resided in New York
and married in Canada prior to the legality of such marriages in the
United States.95 When one died, her spouse sought benefits through
decision marked ‘a historic shift in the Court’s response to anti-gay
discrimination’”).
88. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
89. Id. at 578.
90. Id.
91. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 190.
92. Even when ruling in a manner contrary to the preferences of LGBTQ
equality advocates, Kennedy emphasized his commitment to his legacy on
equality for this group that continues to be victimized by differential treatment.
See Joan Biskupic, Kennedy Keeps Eye Toward Legacy in Same-sex Wedding
Cake
case,
CNN
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/04/politics/anthony-kennedy-same-sex-marriagecolorado-baker/index.html (stating “Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy
tried to make clear on Monday that he was not retreating from his landmark
2015 decision allowing same-sex marriage nationwide, while he sided with a
Colorado baker who refused to create a wedding cake for two gay men”).
93. Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
94. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens’s Retirement is Political
Test for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10
/us/politics/10stevens.html.
95. Robert D. McFadden, Edith Windsor, Whose Same-Sex Marriage Fight
Led to Landmark Ruling, Dies at 88, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/edith-windsor-dead-same-sex-
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the spousal exemption to the federal estate tax. 96 The U.S. Internal
Revenue Service denied these benefits based on the federal Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), a statute enacted by Congress in 1996 that
defined “marriage” solely as the legal union between one man and
one woman.97 In his Windsor opinion on behalf of a five-member
majority, Justice Kennedy struck down DOMA as violating the
equal protection guarantee contained in the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.98
Two years later, Justice Kennedy cemented his legacy as the
Court’s foremost protector of equal rights for LGBTQ persons by
assigning himself the majority opinion in the 5-4 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges.99 This case produced the blockbuster decision
declaring that states’ prohibitions on same-sex marriages violate
the fundamental right to marry, a liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.100 Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor clearly
set the stage for this additional step in marriage equality. 101
Unquestionably, the Obergefell decision will be regarded as
transformational in expanding liberty and equality for people whose
personal relationship decisions were long excluded from
constitutional protection.102

B. Other Controversial Equality Issues
Conservatives and liberals have long debated what evidence
should be required to establish a violation of federal antidiscrimination laws.103 At the heart of the debate is whether an
intent to discriminate must be proven or whether discrimination
can be established by pointing to racial disparities in the aftermath
of decisions.104 These disagreements have occurred continuously
since the Supreme Court began examining cases under federal
employment discrimination statutes that examined whether
marriage-doma.html.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (stating equal protection guards against
discriminatory actions by the federal government).
99. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
100. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a
Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html.
101. Id.
102. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129
HARV. L. REV. 147, 147 (2015).
103. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification
and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1120-27 (2016).
104. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment
Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011) (discussion of theories and
approaches for proving discrimination, including existence or lack thereof of
specific policies producing discrimination).
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apparently neutral employment criteria and practices produced
racial and gender disparities in hiring. 105 Central to the debate is
differing interpretations and conclusions about the intent of
Congress in enacting, amending, and renewing anti-discrimination
statutes.106
In Texas Department of Housing v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc.,107 the justices split along liberal-conservative
dimensions concerning this debate with respect to enforcement of
the Fair Housing Act.108 In effect, Justice Kennedy cast the deciding
vote. He assigned himself the majority opinion on behalf of a fivemember liberal majority to declare that discrimination could be
established by disparate impact theory.109 The case concerned
whether the use of federal tax credits in Texas had the impact of
increasing racial segregation by concentrating construction of lowincome housing in central city areas rather than suburbs. 110 This
continuing controversy stands out as a prime example of a Supreme
Court doctrine that could change in light of Justice Kennedy’s
replacement by the presumptively-more-conservative Justice Brett
Kavanaugh.111
Justice Kennedy similarly cast a deciding vote and assigned
himself the majority opinion in a 4-3 decision in Fisher v. University
of Texas endorsing considerations of race in affirmative action
efforts within universities.112 Affirmative action in university
admissions had divided the Court beginning with its first decision
on the issue in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.113
After the Court’s composition changed significantly in the quartercentury after Bakke,114 the justices reconsidered the issue in cases
105. Id.
106. Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact and
Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626, 631 (2012).
107. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
108. Id.
109. Bagenstos, supra note 103, at 1127-31.
110. Alana Samuels, Supreme Court vs. Neighborhood Segregation, THE
ATLANTIC (June 25, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/06/supreme-court-inclusive-communities/396401/.
111. Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
09/02/us/politics/judge-kavanaugh-supreme-court-justices.html (“‘The key is . .
. the many areas where Kennedy was with the liberals in 5-4 decisions . . .
[including] allowing proof of discrimination based on disparate impact. In all of
these areas of law, Kavanaugh replacing Kennedy will likely mean a significant
change.’”); see also Kevin Cope & Joshua Fischman, It’s Hard to Find a Federal
Judge More Conservative than Brett Kavanaugh, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/05/its-hardto-find-a-federal-judge-more-conservative-than-brettkavanaugh/?utm_term=.27818d1b1835.
112 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
113. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
114. Twenty-five years after Bakke, only two justices—Rehnquist and
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challenging the use of race as a factor in admissions at the
University of Michigan.115 In a major controversial opinion for a
deeply-divided Court, Justice O’Connor, in Grutter v. Bollinger,116
approved the continuation of racial considerations in admissions as
long as it was just one component of a process examining an array
of factors.117 In that case, Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting
opinion to complain that O’Connor and the majority had failed to
apply the “strict scrutiny” standard required by Justice Powell’s
foundational opinion in Bakke.118 In its first iteration in Fisher,
Chief Justice Roberts assigned Justice Kennedy the responsibility
for writing the majority opinion that remanded a white student’s
challenge to the use of race as a consideration in admission to the
lower court.119 In light of his prior dissent in Grutter,120 some
observers anticipated that Justice Kennedy could be part of a slim
majority to reject this form of affirmative action in university
admissions121 when the Fisher case reached the Court a second time
and was decided in 2016.122 However, Kennedy stood with the
liberal justices and spoke on their behalf in approving the Texas
practices, thereby continuing the opportunity for universities to
include race considerations in admissions in order to facilitate a
diverse student body.123 As with disparate impact theory,124 the
legal community will be watching closely to see if this might be
another precedent susceptible to change through a decisive vote in
a different direction by Kennedy’s replacement, Justice

Stevens—remained from the nine decisionmakers who issued the seminal
affirmative action decision in 1978. See Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi
McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2002-2003 United States Supreme Court
Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 869 (2004) (listing justices serving in 2003); see
also CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT 24-29 (1997) (description of post-Bakke appointees who were
serving in 2003: Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer).
115. See TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 226-39 (discussing Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
117. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 398-401.
118. FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL
AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 126-28 (2009).
119. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
120. COLUCCI, supra note 118118.
121. Garrett Epps, Is Affirmative Action Finished?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/when-can-race-bea-college-admissions-factor/419808/.
122. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
123. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action Program at
the University of Texas, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmative-action-university-oftexas.html.
124. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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Kavanaugh.125

C. Criminal Sentencing
Justice Kennedy influenced the reasoning behind divisive
issues surrounding criminal sentencing through assignments in
cases that produced liberal outcomes. He assigned himself the
majority opinion in Hall v. Florida, a 5-4 decision concerning the
death penalty for adults with intellectual disabilities.126 Previously,
in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Stevens, a dominant SAJ, had selfassigned a controversial majority opinion that declared the death
penalty could not be imposed on homicide offenders with
developmental disabilities.127 The state of Florida responded to that
opinion by setting the minimum IQ test score threshold for death
penalty eligibility at 71.128 Hall, who was convicted of murder,
scored 71 on the test and was sentenced to death. 129 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion rejected Florida’s rigid reliance on a
single test score by noting that psychiatric professionals do not treat
such tests as having sufficient precision and, therefore, sciencebased evaluations of intellectual disabilities are determined by
examining and considering a number of factors.130
In several related cases, Justice Kennedy divided the
assignments among several justices. He assigned Justice Ginsburg
the responsibility for writing on behalf of a 5-3 majority in Moore v.
Texas.131 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion declared that the Texas
appellate court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Hall.132 Therefore, Texas violated the Eighth Amendment by using
an outdated definition of intellectual disability for purposes of
determining eligibility for capital punishment. 133 In Brumfield v.
Cain, on a related statutory issue based on an assignment from
Kennedy, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion declared that the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act could not block a
Louisiana prisoner on death row from seeking a hearing on the
extent of his intellectual disability via the habeas corpus process. 134
In McWilliams v. Dunn, Justice Breyer received the majority
opinion assignment and declared that Alabama had failed to fulfill
125. Lorenzo Arvanitis & Serena Cho, Kavanaugh Poses a Potential Threat
for Affirmative Action, Experts Say, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2018/10/15/kavanaugh-poses-a-potentialthreat-for-affirmative-action-experts-say/.
126. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
127. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
128. Hall, 572 U.S. at 704.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 712-14.
131. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
132. Id. at 1049.
133. Id. at 1050.
134. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).
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its constitutional duty to provide a death penalty defendant with a
mental health expert to address questions related to a psychiatric
evaluation of the accused’s capacity and culpability. 135 For another
sentencing issue, he also assigned Justice Kagan the landmark
majority opinion in Miller v. Alabama declaring that the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause precludes
subjecting juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory sentences of
life without parole.136 Her opinion in Miller also concerned mental
capacity issues by recognizing prior precedents that focused on the
less-than-fully-developed brains and thinking capacity of
teenagers.137
Clearly, issues of mental capacity divided the Court and led
Kennedy to side with the liberals for issues concerning matters such
as developmental disabilities, psychiatric evaluation, and juveniles’
brain development.138 Justice Kennedy had previously written the
majority opinion in Graham v. Florida, declaring that juveniles
could not receive life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide
offenses.139 He did not self-assign in Graham, as both Chief Justice
Roberts and then-dominant SAJ Justice Stevens concurred in the
result.140 In 2005, Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion
in Roper v. Simmons, the landmark 5-4 decision declaring that the
Eighth Amendment barred the imposition of a death sentence on
juvenile defendants for crimes committed prior to reaching age
eighteen.141 The opinion in Roper relied on emerging
understandings from neuroscience about the continuing
development of juveniles’ brains that impeded complete
understanding of risks and consequences and, therefore, justified
different punishments than those imposed on adults. 142 Justice
Kennedy’s experience in writing these opinions may have built his
interest and expertise in sentencing issues relating to mental
capacity and developmental disabilities.143 Much like the series of
cases that established Kennedy’s legacy with respect to rights for
LGBTQ persons, Kennedy established a parallel, albeit less
recognized, liberal legacy as the Court’s leader for these issues. 144
The Court experienced similar divisions for statutory

135. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
136. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
137. Id. at 471-72.
138. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
139. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
140. Id.
141. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
142. Id. at 570-75.
143. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s
Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
66, 66 (2010) (stating “His view of childhood and the proper role of judges is
consistent: children and adolescents are unformed works in progress, in the
midst of both character and brain development”).
144. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
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sentencing issues concerning the applicability of federal sentencing
guidelines. In Freeman v. United States, Justice Kennedy selfassigned the Court’s plurality opinion declaring that a defendant
who agreed to a specific sentence in a plea agreement could benefit
from the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s subsequent retroactive
reduction for the presumptive sentence for his offense. 145 In the
latter case of Hughes v. United States, Kennedy’s self-assigned
majority opinion put his Freeman plurality reasoning firmly into
precedential law by gaining the additional support of Justices
Sotomayor and Gorsuch for a six-member majority supporting
requests for sentence reductions by federal drug offenders after
retroactive changes by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 146 In
Dorsey v. United States, an earlier case concerning a parallel
retroactivity issue, Justice Kennedy assigned the majority opinion
to Justice Breyer in a 5-4 decision granting retroactive benefits to
affected offenders convicted prior to congressional passage of the
Fair Sentencing Act.147 Because these statutory sentencing issues
divided the Court in a way that placed Kennedy with a liberal
majority, they created opportunities for him to use his DSAJ
authority to influence the development of law through the
assignment of opinions.

D. Representation by Counsel
Issues surrounding the right to presence of, representation by,
and effective assistance from counsel divided the Court in ways that
separated Justice Kennedy from Chief Justice Roberts with respect
to several issues. Indeed, the gulf between conservative and liberal
justices on this issue in the Roberts Court era seems to be everwidening as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have presented an
originalist challenge to the idea that the Sixth Amendment should
actually require appointment of counsel to indigent criminal
defendants, let alone further require such representative to be
effective.148
Justice Kennedy self-assigned two majority opinions
addressing responsibilities of criminal defense attorneys in plea
negotiations.149 In Missouri v. Frye, an attorney representing a man
with multiple convictions for driving with a revoked license received
a prosecutorial offer recommending a 90-day jail sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea to a reduced misdemeanor charge.150 The

145. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
146. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
147. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012).
148. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 756-759 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156
(2012).
150. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 138.
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attorney never communicated that offer to his client. 151 Instead, the
client was sentenced to three years in prison after conviction on a
felony charge for the offenses.152 On behalf of a five-member
majority, Kennedy declared that criminal defense attorneys have an
obligation to inform their clients about plea agreements offered by
the prosecution.153
In the companion case of Lafler v. Cooper that involved a nonfatal shooting, the defendant communicated to the court a
willingness to plead guilty in exchange for several dropped charges
and a sentence of 51 to 85 months in prison.154 However, the
attorney persuaded the defendant to withdraw any formal
acceptance of the offer and instead go to trial because the attorney
gravely misunderstood the elements of assault with intent to
murder.155 The defendant was convicted at trial on all charges and
sentenced to 185 to 360 months in prison—a minimum period of
incarceration that was nearly four times greater than that
contained in the offer he declined on the mistake-driven advice of
his attorney.156 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion found a violation
of the right to effective assistance of counsel should exist when a
defendant declines a plea agreement due to his attorney’s advice
based on an erroneous understanding of applicable law.157
Justice Kennedy assigned two other counsel-related cases to
Justice Breyer, his most like-minded colleague, in cases with liberal
outcomes. In Turner v. Rogers, Breyer wrote for a five-member
majority in identifying a due process-based right to counsel, or
equivalent safeguards, for people facing the possibility of jail as a
result of a failure to pay child support. 158 The other Breyer opinion
in Trevino v. Thaler granted to a Texas death row inmate the
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims
belatedly as part of habeas corpus review when that state’s
procedures did not provide a realistic opportunity for the claim to
be raised earlier on direct appeal.159

E. Other Criminal Justice Issues
Justice Kennedy asserted himself as the opinion writer in two
other important cases with slim five-member majorities. In
Williams v. Pennsylvania, in the course of a post-conviction
proceeding in state court, a convicted death row offender submitted

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1405.
153. Id. at 1408.
154. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 160.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 172-74.
158. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
159. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013).

2019]

Justice Kennedy’s Influence and Impact

929

a request for a state supreme court justice to recuse himself. 160 At
the time of trial, the justice had been the district attorney for the
jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted and had
personally approved a subordinate’s decision to seek the death
penalty in the case.161 Addressing the matter as a case of first
impression, Kennedy’s opinion declared that this situation
presented a due process violation because of the impermissible risk
of bias from one adjudicator that was a key decision maker in the
accusatory process.162
The second case raised the question of whether the Supreme
Court would recognize an exception to the traditional common law
rule that the jury’s deliberations and verdict shall not be questioned
after the verdict has been issued. 163 In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
the jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault. 164 In the
course of talking to jurors before they departed the courthouse, a
defense attorney learned from two jurors that a third juror had
made ethnically-biased statements about the defendant, including
assumptions about the aggressiveness of “Mexican” men toward
women.165 The two jurors signed affidavits confirming what they
had told the attorney, and the attorney submitted this information
to the trial judge who declined to overturn the verdict or order a new
trial.166 Instead, the judge cited state rules of evidence and their
reliance on the traditional common law practice of accepting the
finality of the jury’s verdict based on an eighteenth-century English
court decision prohibiting jurors from providing information about
what was said in the course of jury deliberations. 167 When American
jurisdictions codified the rule, there were very few exceptions that
would lead to a legally-mandated reconsideration of a verdict. 168 In
seventeen states, these state-law exceptions include racial-bias
exceptions.169 In this case, however, the Court was asked if there
could be a constitutional violation from post-verdict revelations
about prejudicial jurors’ statements in a state criminal case.170
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning placed great emphasis on the essential
need to rid the justice system of racial discrimination and bias even
if there is good reason to respect the finality of jury verdicts. 171
Kennedy articulated the Court’s holding as:
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she
160. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1909-10.
163. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 862.
167. Id. at 862-63.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 870.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 867-68.
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relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant,
the Sixth Amendment requires that the [traditional jury] noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to
consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting
denial of the jury trial guarantee.172

Justice Kennedy emphasized that not every prejudicial statement
will produce a constitutional violation. 173 Instead, “the statement
must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating
factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”174
In the Williams and Peńa-Rodriguez cases,175 Justice Kennedy
seized the opportunity to place his imprint on the developing law
affecting fairness and equality in the justice system.176 Much like
his majority opinions concerning sentences for juveniles and
limiting death penalty eligibility for murder defendants with
intellectual disabilities, these were consequential decisions that
made important statements about the ideals of the justice
system.177 It is certainly true that one could imagine other justices
within the five-member majorities writing powerful opinions on
these issues, such as Justice Sotomayor if she had been assigned the
opinion in Peña-Rodriguez.178 However, it seems clear that Kennedy
wanted the opportunity to assert himself on these issues and
thereby, in effect, make them a component of his historic legacy. 179
Justice Kennedy assigned himself the majority opinion in an
exceptionally divisive, controversial prison reform case, Brown v.
Plata.180 From the 1970s through the 1990s, federal judges
throughout the country issued orders requiring improvements in
prison conditions and practices to fulfill Eighth Amendment
standards.181 These decisions were very controversial because they
required significant public expenditures on incarcerated
populations in order to improve facilities, provide health care, and
mandate hiring and training staff to increase health and safety in
correctional institutions.182 Critics of judicial intervention into
172. Id. at 869.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Williams, 136 S. Ct. 1899; Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
176. See supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 126, 136-43 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Smith & Petlakh, supra note 16, at 463 (stating “Justice
Sotomayor gained national attention . . . for her explicit and assertive rejection
of Chief Justice John Roberts’s effort to downplay problems of racial inequality
and discrimination in American society”).
179. Justice Kennedy had the option of assigning these opinions to Justice
Sotomayor or other justice in the majority, but he chose to employ his authority
as DSAJ to assign the majority opinions to himself.
180. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
181. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 3446 (1998).
182. Id.
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correctional institutions pushed Congress to impose procedural
rules on judicial authority under civil rights statutes in order to
limit what they regarded as expensive interference into the
operations of state and local corrections systems. 183 The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”) 184 made it more difficult for
prisoners to file federal civil rights lawsuits and limited the
authority of federal judges to issue remedial orders and then
maintain supervision over the implementation of those orders.185
Following this, federal judicial supervision of and intervention into
corrections systems focused on very specific problems in prisons
rather than orchestrating large-scale institutional or systemic
reforms.186 And then came Brown, the case in which Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion reminded that nation that conditions in
prisons could be so deficient as to require expensive judicial-ordered
remedies, even under the restrictions imposed by the PLRA. 187
When the case reached the Supreme Court, California’s prisons
had been at nearly 200 percent capacity for at least 11 years, with
a state-wide prison population of 156,000.188 One consequence of the
state’s prison overcrowding, in addition to cramming rows of bunk
beds into prison gyms and other available spaces, was a lack of
proper medical and mental health facilities. 189 As a result, evidence
documented preventable deaths every month from untreated
medical conditions and suicides as well as horrific treatment of
prisoners with mental health crises. 190 Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion took the extraordinarily unusual step of including
photographs of overcrowded conditions and phone-booth-sized cages
where officials locked up prisoners who needed mental health
treatment.191 The majority opinion, on behalf of five justices,
183. ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 188-89 (2003).
184. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996).
185. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 183, at 188-89.
186. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 181, at 50 (stating that “[t]he Prison
Litigation Reform Act . . . require[es] courts to link their remedial orders to
specific constitutional violations”).
187. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails,
Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 165,
165 (2013) (explaining that “[n]ot since 1978 had the Court ratified a lower
court’s crowding-related order in a jail or prison case”).
188. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 500.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and
Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. REV. 853, 885 (2011). During oral arguments,
Justice Sotomayor pointedly challenged California’s attorney by asking, “When
are you going to avoid the needless deaths that were reported in the record?
When are you going to avoid or get around [to] people sitting in their feces for
days in a dazed state?” Id.
191. See Dave Gilson, California’s Jam-Packed Prisons, MOTHER JONES
(July 25, 2011), www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/07/california-crowdedprisons/ (stating the reproduction of photographs from Justice Kennedy’s
opinion along with the author’s comment that inclusion of the photographs in
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supported the lower court’s remedial order that required the prison
system to reduce its population to 137 percent capacity and
significantly improve the availability and operation of medical and
mental health services.192
Justice Kennedy’s opinion elicited stark, shrill dissenting
opinions written by Justices Scalia and Alito. 193 Justice Scalia
viewed the decision as demonstrating that judges interfere too often
in public policy issues about which they have no expertise and
competence. As a longtime critic of liberal judicial policy making, 194
Justice Kennedy’s opinion epitomized all that Scalia viewed as
wrong with judicial policy making by affecting the governance of
institutions and imposing costs on society. 195 Justice Alito used
frightening language about the Court’s opinion requiring the
release of tens of thousands of dangerous felons who would prey on
the citizens of California and cause untold violence and carnage. 196
In actuality, the judicial decision effectively permitted California to
develop a plan for reducing the prison population. 197 California did
not engage in wholesale prisoner release as Alito and Scalia
assumed would be the case.198 Instead, the prison population went
down through the process of scheduled parole releases combined
with a focus on sending fewer people to prison.199 California worked
with counties to pay for a new sentencing plan that would have
people convicted of non-violent, non-sex offenses, those that drew
sentences of three years or less, serve their time in county jails—at
state expense—rather than add to the population of prisons. 200
Much like Kennedy’s opinions in LGBTQ equality cases, 201 the
reasoning and the conclusion of the majority opinion in Brown
demonstrated that he had greater sensitivity and concern than his
usual conservative allies202 about the treatment of those whose daily
the opinion “suggest[ed] they played a role in convincing Kennedy”).
192. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1938-43.
193. Christopher E. Smith, Inside America’s Criminal Justice System: The
Supreme Court on the Rights of the Accused and the Incarcerated: Brown v.
Plata, the Roberts Court, and the Future of Conservative Perspectives on Rights
Behind Bars, 46 AKRON L. REV. 519, 539-45 (2013).
194. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 58 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating “[i]n my view, the Court
. . . goes further, much further to embrace by broad dictum an expansion of
power in the Federal Judiciary beyond all precedent.”).
195. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 550-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 579-81 (Alito, J., dissenting).
197. Schlanger, supra note 187, at 184-85.
198. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting). “The threejudge court ordered the premature release of approximately 46,000 criminals—
the equivalent of three Army divisions[.]” Id.
199. Schlanger, supra note 187, at 184-91.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 190, at 876-79 (describing the initial
orientation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito toward cases raising
issues concerning prisoners’ rights).
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experiences are often viewed with indifference or hostility by a large
segment of the American population.203

IV. CONCLUSION
Authorship of judicial opinions is typically the most visible
means by which Supreme Court justices shape the law and impact
society.204 In the aftermath of Justice Kennedy’s retirement from
the Supreme Court in 2018, scholars presented analyses of
Kennedy’s opinions in order to assess his influence over the course
of his three decades on the high court.205 However, the authorship
of opinions is not the sole path to influence for those associate
justices who serve long enough to become the SAJ with authority to
make majority opinion assignments for cases in which the chief
justice is a dissenter.206 Opinion assignments by the SAJ have
rarely been analyzed by scholars. 207 But, they deserve attention in
the case of Justice Kennedy because he, like his predecessor Justice
Stevens, emerged as the dominant assigner of majority opinions
among associate justices for his era, making nearly four dozen
assignments from 2010 to 2018.208
In his role as DSAJ, Kennedy was notable in his selfassignment of majority opinions for blockbuster cases concerning
same-sex marriage and LGBTQ rights, 209 an area in which he had
already established himself as a leading figure in the development

203. See Jennifer Lackey, The Measure of a Country is How it Treats its
Prisoners. The U.S. is Failing., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2019),
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-measure-of-a-country-is-how-it-treatsits-prisoners-the-us-is-failing/2019/02/06/8df29acc-2a1c-11e9-984d9b8fba003e81_story.html (providing descriptions of incarcerated individuals
treated with indifference, thereby contributing to harsh and dangerous living
conditions in institutions).
204. Justice Stevens once said, “You judge Justices by the work product that
they produce when they’re on the Court.” THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK
FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 50 (Brian Lamb, Susan Swain
& Mark Farkas, eds., 2010).
205. See Mitchell Berman & David Peters, Kennedy’s Legacy: A Principled
Justice, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 311 (2019); Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice
Kennedy: A Free Speech Justice? Only Sometimes, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1193 (2019);
Matthew Coles, The Profound Political But Elusive Legal Legacy of Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s LGBT Decisions, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2019); Frank J.
Colucci, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Federalism and the Limits of State
Sovereignty, 49 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 490 (2019); Owen Kerr, Justice
Kennedy and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1213
(2019).
206. Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 753-64.
207. The exceptional analyses that focus on opinion assignments by SAJs
are Jacobs & Smith, supra note 19, at 753-64, MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS, &
WAHLBECK, supra note 68, at 53-56, and SMITH, supra note 18, at 244-245.
208. See supra Tables 1-4.
209. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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of protective legal doctrines.210 In so doing, he cemented his legacy
as the key figure in any scholarly or journalistic analyses of the
development of legal protections for LGBTQ individuals.211 By
contrast, with respect to issues of mental capacity and criminal
sentencing, Kennedy also assigned opinions to other justices rather
than use assignment power as an opportunity to further his direct
impact on authoritative reasoning and enhance his own legacy for
that issue.212 Interestingly, Kennedy’s overall voting record on
criminal justice issues placed him among the Court’s conservatives,
albeit moderately conservative rather than predictably conservative
like Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.213
Yet, he stood out for using his assignment powers to self-assign
important rights-protective cases in criminal justice for such
matters as protecting defendants in the plea bargaining process, 214
diminishing discrimination in jury trials,215 and improving
conditions of confinement in prison.216 Justice Kennedy’s assertion
of his own reasoning in these cases did not reflect inconsistency with
his generally conservative voting record but, instead, reaffirmed the
observation of one scholar: “He found himself in the middle because
his jurisprudential commitments led him to vote in ways that did
not cluster neatly in one area on a conventional ideological
spectrum.”217
As indicated by this analysis of Justice Kennedy, as well as the
comparison to Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court’s associate
justices deserve attention and analysis for their important opinionassigning duties when the chief justice is among the dissenters. The
foregoing discussion illustrates how Kennedy impacted the
development of law, especially by using opportunities for selfassignment for a number of notable decisions. The new SAJ most
likely to assign majority opinions is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
when the four most-liberal justices earn the fifth vote of a
conservative justice. That is, unless the defecting conservative is
Justice Clarence Thomas, who could then make the assignment

210. See supra notes 84-9191 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 92 (describing Kennedy’s legacy and its
maintenance even in a decision that went against expanded constitutional
protections for LGBTQ individuals); Lucy Li, A Lesson from Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy, THE TEX. ORATOR (Sept. 10, 2018),
thetexasorator.com/2018/09/10/a-lesson-from-supreme-court-justice-anthonykennedy/. “What Kennedy will be most remembered for, more than upholding
the rights of women and minorities, is his contribution to the LGBTQ
community.” Id.
212. See supra 126-45 and accompanying text.
213. Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 61, at 422.
214. Frye, 566 U.S. 134; Lafler, 566 U.S. 156.
215. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
216. Brown, 563 U.S. 493.
217. Jack L. Goldsmith, In Tribute: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 13 (2018).

2019]

Justice Kennedy’s Influence and Impact

935

himself.218 However, recent news that eighty-six-year-old Justice
Ginsburg has been treated for cancer for the fourth time raises
questions about her likely future tenure on the Court and the
number of potential opportunities she may receive to assign
majority opinions as the SAJ.219 If she were to leave the Court prior
to the 2020 elections and be replaced by a conservative appointee of
President Donald J. Trump, it would presumably create a consistent
six-member conservative majority that would be unaffected by the
defection of one justice.220 This potential scenario is a reminder that
the opportunities and impact of SAJs as majority opinion assigners
depends on the context of the Court during each historical period.
The impact and influence exercised by Justices Kennedy and
Stevens over dozens of cases in their time as DSAJ 221 may not occur
again for a justice unless the Court’s composition and voting
coalitions allow an influential dominant SAJ to emerge. Indeed, any
appointments by President Trump that solidify the conservative
majority in the near future will simply increase the already-potent
assignment power of Chief Justice Roberts—who would less
frequently find himself among the dissenters. 222

218. Justice Thomas was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1991 and
Justice Ginsburg was appointed in 1993. About the Court: Current Members, S.
CT., www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx.
219. Emily S. Rueb, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Treated for Tumor on Her
Pancreas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/us/ruthbader-ginsburg-health-cancer.html
220. Ed Kilgore, A Supreme Court Vacancy in 2020 Could Change
Everything, N.Y. MAG (Aug. 26, 2019), nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/08/
ginsburgs-health-a-reminder-supreme-court-big-2020-prize.html.
221. See supra Tables 1-4.
222. For example, during the 2018 term, Chief Justice Roberts was in the
majority in 85 percent of the Court’s 72 full cases. Among the eleven cases in
which he was a dissenter, nine of those decisions were 5-to-4 votes that would
have actually placed Roberts in the majority if Ginsburg had been replaced
earlier by a Trump-appointed conservative. Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for
October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 5:59 PM),
www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2018/.
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